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Abstract: 
The historical shipping routes between Helsinki/Turku, Finland and Stockholm, Sweden have been 
operated for decades as duopolies with some insignificant fringe competition. Although the traffic to 
and from Estonia was already lively and its effects were being felt by Viking Line, the Estonian accession 
in 2004 had a profound effect; it offered an opportunity to cut costs by flagging ships over to Estonia 
and by introducing Estonian salary levels for the on-board workforce, thus significantly reducing 
personnel costs. This business case analyses the response of Viking Line to this changing environment.  
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1. Introduction 
The historical shipping routes between Helsinki/Turku, Finland and Stockholm, Sweden have been 
operated for decades as duopolies with some insignificant fringe competition. The market is seasonal, 
with profit mainly being made during the short summer break, whereas during the rest of the year the 
companies try to achieve break-even levels of activity by offering discounts and various attractions on 
board. 
The revenue model of the ferry companies was originally based on sales of tickets to passengers. 
However, in the 1980s earnings from on-board entertainment started to become more significant: the 
experience on board was gaining in importance, and arrival to the port was of less importance, as 
passengers would settle in for a good sleep after enjoying the leisure and entertainment offerings. 
Tax-free sales of alcohol and tobacco between Finland and Sweden, where these goods were extremely 
expensive, were the key on-board service1 and created 50% of the turnover. Total on-board sales 
represented 70% of the turnover2.  
In 1999, the European Union (EU) decided3 to abolish duty free sales within 
the internal market. However, Åland Islands (the richest province in Finland) 
obtained a special status in the accession negotiations4. The condition for 
continuing tax-free sales on ferries was a stop-over at the Åland Islands. 
Therefore, the derogation secured a continuous tax advantage as well as good 
connections to and from the Islands. It was estimated that the elimination of 
the derogation would have had dramatic effects on Åland Islands, among 
others a fall of 40% in passenger traffic5. 
 
1.1 Participants in the ferry market in 2004 
In 2004 Viking Line and Silja Line shared the ferry market. They competed on roughly equal terms on all 
routes between Sweden and Finland. Both companies operated daily from Helsinki and twice a day from 
Turku to Stockholm and vice versa. Their timetables were close to identical, amongst others for safety 
reasons6. Silja Line was slightly more competitive in the high-end segment after the commission of Silja 
Symphony and Silja Serenade7 featuring a shopping street inside the ferry. The severe economic 
depression in the early 1990s had put the two companies under pressure, and new ship orders for 
operations on routes between Finland and Sweden were not seen as feasible.  
                                                            
1 Konsekvenser av att taxfreeförsäljningen avvecklasinom EU, 1998, Sammanfattningen 
2 Den Ålandsbaserade sjöfartens ekonomiska betydelse, pp.39 
3 Article 28 of 91/680/CEE and Article 28 of Directive 92/12/CEE 
4 See Annex 5 
5 Den Ålands baserade sjöfartens ekonomiska betydelse, op.cit. pp. 101 
6 In case of “man over board” situations, the other ship can help in rescue operations 
7 Ship data, available at  www.faktaomfartyg.se/silja_serenade_1990.htm 08.February.2011 
Silja Symphony 
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Possible explanations are the relatively low profitability of the routes, the relatively large investment 
required in relation to net profit, uncertainty about the taxation environment, and the need to direct 
investments to the Helsinki-Tallinn (Estonia) route. 
1.2 Viking Line and its management 
Viking Line is listed on the Helsinki stock exchange, but it is controlled by a few large Åland-based 
stockholders8. These large investors are known for prudency and cautiousness, which is reflected in the 
company’s conservative management style. Dick Lundqvist, the CEO of the largest and third largest 
shareholders, is the long-time chairman of the board, backed by 25% of voting rights. The board is 
mostly composed of directors representing large owners. 
Viking Line’s CEO from 1990 to 2010, Nils-Erik Eklund, served the company for roughly 40 years. He 
became a CEO “from within”. He is well connected to the major shareholders, which is not an unusual 
situation on Åland.  
2. The Estonian accession and the Freedom of Establishment 
The independence of Estonia in the 1990s, followed by its accession to the Schengen area in 2003 and to 
the EU in 2004 led to a rapid increase in ferry traffic to and from Estonia9. The underlying reasons are 
the large differences in standard of living, level of salaries, and the price of alcohol and tobacco between 
Estonia and other countries in the region. Routes were opened between Helsinki and Tallinn and also 
between Tallinn and Stockholm.  
Tax-free sales have never been a major issue on boats operating to and from Estonia, as the price of 
alcohol in Estonia is low. The significant impact of the opening up of Estonia was the creation of a 
substitute for the traditional routes between Finland and Sweden. Viking Line observed a rapid 
expansion of the market and the emergence of many new competitors. Shorter distances and lower 
petrol costs for ferry companies were and still are an advantage compared to the routes to Sweden. 
Although the traffic to and from Estonia was already lively and its effects were being felt by Viking Line, 
the Estonian accession in 2004 had a profound effect. The Estonian accession brought with it the full 
impact of the EU treaties. Especially critical for Viking Line is Article 49 of the Treaty of the European 
Community (TEC): 
“Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on the freedom of establishment of 
nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be prohibited. Such 
prohibition shall also apply to restrictions on the setting-up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by 
nationals of any Member State established in the territory of any Member State”. 10 
                                                            
8 See Annex 1 
9 Den Ålands baserade sjöfartens ekonomiska betydelse, op.cit. pp. 39 
10 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12008E049:en:HTML 
Nils-Erik Eklund 
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Thus, the Treaty offered an opportunity to cut costs by flagging ships over to Estonia and by introducing 
Estonian salary levels for the on-board workforce, thus significantly reducing personnel costs. 
2.1 Tallink: The Emerging Rival 
Due to the lower level of salaries and taxes, Estonian crews are cheaper than Finnish crews. As a result, 
on routes between Helsinki and Tallinn, Estonian companies have gained a strong foothold. Tallink AS 
has become a market leader. In a time of easy credit and rapid economic growth in Estonia, Tallink could 
access financial resources that allowed a rapid expansion of its capacity11, embarking on an aggressive 
strategy of growth. Tallink has been increasingly profitable every year, and during the financial year 
2004-2005, Tallink’s net profit rose to €30 million and its turnover grew with an impressive 24%12. Until 
this time, Tallink was focused on operating from its home base, Tallinn, but in 2006 it made a major 
strategic move by purchasing Viking Lines’ main competitor Silja Line from Sea Containers Ltd.13 As a 
result of this €450 million14 deal, Tallink Silja turned from being a minor player to a direct competitor. It 
overtook the overall market leadership in the Baltic Sea.  
The importance of the transaction is illustrated by the fact that the total passenger volume transported 
by Silja Line was larger than that of Tallink15. Silja Lines’ services between Tallinn and Helsinki were 
excluded from the deal and were divested to a third party who continued to operate them as an 
independent company. Viking Line was also interested in the acquisition of Silja Line16  but failed to win 
the contest. 
 
2.2 Other Competition 
Around 2003 the market for the Helsinki-Tallinn route was an oligopolistic market with diversified 
companies. In general, ferry companies had to strike a balance between speed and services and 
reliability. Fast and light ships had the advantage of speed, but could not operate without disruptions 
caused by the weather. Midsize ships could not traffic in icy conditions, but large, slow ships could offer 
year-around service. At the extreme end of the spectrum was Copterline, a helicopter service that could 
take the passenger to Tallinn in less than 30 minutes. Copterline’s reliability turned out to be lowest of 
them all, as a tragic accident in 2005 ended its operations abruptly. 
                                                            
11 www.tallink.com/mainMenu/company/history/ 8 February 2011 
12 Tallink annual report 2004/2005 
13 www.tallink.com/mainMenu/company/history/ op.cit 
14 Helsingin Sanomat: Tallink buys Silja for EUR 450 million and Stock 08 February 2011 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
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3. Viking Line’s Response 
The accession of Finland and Sweden (1995) to the EU had disrupted the peace for a while, but its effect 
was successfully mitigated by the special status obtained by Åland. In 2004 life in the archipelago idyll 
was disrupted again. Traffic to Estonia was increasing, as many customers could buy their alcohol and 
cigarettes cheaper and faster there – a direct threat to Viking Line, bearing in mind the crucial 
importance of on-board sales. 
3.1 The Helsinki-Tallinn Market 
Staying out of the lucrative Estonian market was not a long term option. Viking Line had a fleet 
composed of large ships, and it could enter the market without new investments. Therefore, the 
decision to enter the Tallinn market was self-evident. Besides, the company had already operated the 
route on an irregular basis since the 1990s17. Nils-Erik Eklund now decided to launch regular traffic with 
M/S Rosella18. The business model continued to be the same: M/S Rosella would mainly float the night 
in the Gulf of Finland and then quickly enter Tallinn to pick up the alcohol and head back to Helsinki, 
while passengers enjoyed heavy drinking and dancing. 
The demand, however, changed considerably; fewer and fewer people were interested in spending the 
entire night on board. Instead, customers increasingly demanded fast, regular connections to go to work 
in Finland or to buy alcohol supplies in Estonia. At this time the m/S Rosella was almost 30 years old and 
not fast enough to compete head-to-head against modern ships. Viking Lines’ market share on the route 
remained low, at only 17.8%19. M/S Rosella was making losses due to the fierce competition on the 
                                                            
17 Viking Cinderella in Wikipedia, 11 February 2011 
18 Commissioned in 1980 
19 Viking Line Annual Report 2004-2005  
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Helsinki-Tallinn route20. The current business model, similar to that of Viking Line’s other routes, was not 
feasible on the Helsinki-Tallinn route. The management was required to take action. 
3.1.1 The new ship 
The Viking Line board faced a difficult decision in 2005. The company did not 
have any light, fast ships. It did have large ships and small ships, but none was 
fast. The situation was clear; business as usual would create losses, thus 
further reducing the company’s low profitability21. A withdrawal was 
unthinkable as it would have constituted a withdrawal from the only growth 
market the company had. Regardless of the unfeasibility of M/S Rosella for its 
task, Viking Line could not ignore the fact that the traffic to Tallinn had grown 16% year-on-year 
compared to 2003/200422. Eventually, the EU-accession related market changes and the resulting 
increase in demand forced Viking Line to take action23: the company ordered a new ship, the XRPS, with 
the goal of raising its market share to 20%.  
The XRPS was a combination of a traditional cruise ship and a fast ship like the Super SeaCats with year-
around service capability, with an idea akin to a WW1 era battlecruiser: bigger than anything that was 
faster, while faster than anything that was bigger. This combination of speed and comfort was a 
carefully considered concept to address the changing market situation24. 
However, Tallink was a step ahead of Viking Line. In 2007 and 2008 respectively it commissioned M/S 
Star and M/S Superstar, two ships with the same passenger capacity than Viking XRPS, but faster25. 
Additionally, Tallink launched a new schedule with an increased number of daily crossings. 
3.1.2 Outflagging 
Viking Line continued to explore other options to combat Tallink, its rising rival. Pressure was growing to 
neutralize Tallink’s cost advantage due to cheaper labor by reflagging ships to Estonia and subsequently 
recruiting local labor. The Finnish labor force was strongly unionized, and the Seamen’s Union was 
especially known for its aggressive behavior. 
Although this strategy risked Viking Lines’ long-term relationships with the trade unions, the company’s  
net profit in 2004/2005 tumbled to below €1 million from levels between €13 million and €23 million 
during the four years prior26. Viking Line stated that in order to maintain cost efficiency, named as a 
cornerstone of its strategy, its crew costs should not exceed those of competitors27. The board knew 
that if it could check the cost advantage of Tallinn, it would probably emerge as a winner in the contest, 
as it would still be in possession of the better image and better customer relationships in Finland and in 
                                                            
20 Case C-438/05 of the ECJ, paragraph 9 
21 See annex 4: ROE 2,2% in 2004/2005 
22 VL Annual report 2004/2005 pp. 12 
23 Ibid. pp. 6 
24 Finnguide 12 December 2005 
25 Tallink hompage/fleet 
26 Annual report 2004/2005, 02 April 2011 
27 ibid., pp.20, 02 April 2011 
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Sweden. In the end, the board decided to move forward; it notified the Finnish Seamen’s Union (FSU) 
that it would reflag the ship to Estonia to be able to exploit the more favorable conditions vis-à-vis the 
employees in Estonia and would not be bound by the Finnish Collective Bargaining Agreement28. 
The FSU threatened with a strike, even though it had a valid contract with the employer side. Viking Line 
believed that the strike would be illegal as it would de facto constitute an attempt to prevent an 
establishment of the company’s operations in another member country - a right specifically protected in 
the EU treaties. The matter was taken to a national court. The national court decided to refer the case to 
the Court of Justice of the European Union. The referring national court asked whether strike action or 
collective action could limit the freedom of establishment. The Court of Justice ruled that strike action 
could be an impediment to the freedom of establishment but it could be justified if it was necessary to 
protect the rights of workers and then only if the restriction was proportional. 
 As a result of the court case, “Social Europe” had gained a victory, while the Lundqvist and 
Blosmterlund families, the ultimate decision makers at Viking Line, had to withdraw: M/S Rosella was 
never reflagged to Estonia. M/S Rosella would stay in place for another 3 years defending Viking Line’s 
market share. Subsequently, both the M/S XRPS and the M/S Rosella were flagged to Sweden. 
3.2  A new CEO for Viking Line 
The stagnation of the company, with virtually no growth on the horizon and withlarge looming 
investments, prompted the Viking board of directors to consider the need for new ideas. The two-
decade-long reign of Nils-Erik Eklund was announced to end in March 2010, and Viking Line launched 
the search for a new CEO in late 200829. In May 2009 it announced the appointment of Mikael Backman 
as the new CEO. Backman had previously worked for the Royal Caribbean ship lines, and the idea was to 
gain new ideas and insight into Viking Line’s operations30. 
Backman was expected to bring ideas on how to attract North American customers to the ships, but also 
on the more advanced service concept that is in use in the Caribbean. The sale of on-board services, as 
opposed to the sale of on-board goods, would be a new concept for the Baltic market. The appointment 
of a new CEO with deep know-how in on-board services points to the direction that Viking Line was 
trying to increase its sales by expanding its on-board services. 
Backman started his tenure at Viking Line in a very unconventional way. For the first 6 months he 
worked as a trainee in bars, shops, check-in, i.e. all the major non-technical functions in order to learn 
about the company, its workers, and customers31. This has surely earned him the respect of the 
employees. 
                                                            
28 Case C-438/05 op.cit. Paragraph 18  
29 Taloussanomat 29 October 2008 
30 Viking Line press release 07 May 2009 
31 The author has personally talked to many Viking Line employees and asked about their experiences during many 
trips on Viking Line 
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3.3  The Turku-Stockholm Market 
Since the commissioning of Silja Europe in 1993, no new ships had been introduced on the routes 
between Helsinki/Turku and Stockholm. The competitor Tallink was highly leveraged after the 
acquisition of Silja Line in 2005 and had focused its investments on its primary markets, ship routes to 
and from Estonia. Its debtors eventually took over control as a consequence of the financial crisis in 
2009. The financial crisis also had another significant impact on the environment – the order stock in the 
Finnish shipyards would be running out in 201032, thus threatening the existence of the Finnish 
shipbuilding cluster. 
 
3.3.1  New Ship Order 
Mikael Backman spotted an opportunity to gain an advantage over Tallink Silja. In June 2009, shortly 
after his appointment was announced, he stated that “if we are ever going to order a new ship, now is 
the time”. At this time Viking Line’s decision making was a bit diffuse, as Backman, although nominated 
to become the CEO and employed by the company, was not yet officially the CEO. 
The management team thought that it could put considerable pressure on the political leadership in a 
situation where unemployment was rising and the global shipbuilding market was coming to a standstill. 
Providing work for the community around Turku would also be seen to be favorable by its customer 
base and to improve the company’s image. The competitive advantage created by the ship could be 
assumed to last at least a few years as Tallink, due to financial difficulties, would not be able to respond 
this time. 
The new order was worth €240 million33, a considerable investment to a company which, during the five 
previous years, had had an average net profit of €17 million34. The investment was equal to the net 
profit of 14 years. The main owners were hesitant, fearing that the dividend stream would dry out. The 
Viking Line board decided to look for broader support for the project, and opened negotiations with the 
Finnish government35, at the same time engaging a Korean shipyard to ask for another offer in order to 
put more pressure on the authorities. 
As the order stock in the Finnish shipyards was running out as a result of the financial crisis36, the 
government finally yielded to Viking Line’s demands and approved a subsidy package as detailed below. 
Although Article 107 TFEU prohibits in principles subsidies (state aid), it also allows under certain 
conditions aid to shipbuilding.  
                                                            
32 Helsingin Sanomat 14 October 2010 
33 Kauppalehti 29 June 2009 
34 Viking Line press release 22 December 2010 
35 Taloussanomat 5 April 2011 
36 Helsingin Sanomat 14 October 2010 op.cit. 
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As a result, the following types of aid were allowed by the European Commission to be granted to Viking 
Line37: 
1. The acquisition of new environmentally-friendly ships, €30 million, pending on the approval of the 
European Commission.  
2. Innovation subsidies, ”just under €10 million”.  
3. Offering loan guarantees or interest subsidies.  
4. The deal should be completed by the summer of 2010. 
This represented a subsidy of roughly 20% of the price of the ship. However, Mikael Backman, attentive 
to Viking Line’s cautious major owners, pressed STX Finland, the owner of Turku shipyard, heavily in 
price negotiations and eventually walked away from the deal in June 201038. It looked like the days of 
the Finnish shipbuilding cluster were numbered. 
Finally, in October 2010, STX Finland agreed to Viking Line’s conditions. Mikael Backman signed the deal 
(including a letter of intent for another ship), on condition that the subsidies, as promised by the 
minister of Economic affairs Mr. Mauri Pekkarinen, could be obtained39. The deal was confirmed by the 
Finnish government in December, but remained conditional to the approval of the European 
Commission (EC), as the environment-related state-aid package required EC approval40. 
The key advantages gained by introducing a new ship can be listed as follows: 
1. Customer curiosity for a new ship can initially create more demand  
2. Environmental edge: a better image for the company and lower fuel consumption  
3. Speed:  facilitates a slightly longer stay in harbor, and customers need not be disturbed as much 
with cleaning at night during the cruise  
4. Makes Viking Line the premium market player, with a good chance to entice the high-end segment  
4. The Market in 2011  
The business of Viking Line in 2011 continues to be business as usual. On most routes, the ferries are 
sales and entertainment centers, and transport is secondary. 
In duopolistic competition, price increases are immediately mirrored in lost market share, as these 
prices are easily comparable, regardless of the fact that Viking Line and other actors operate loyal 
customer programs. 
It is theoretically possible to enter the market between Finland and Sweden by transferring ships from 
abroad, but the market is not large enough for three major ferry lines, so such entry would result in a 
                                                            
37 see Annex 3 
38 Uusi Suomi, 3 June 2010 
39 Ibid 
40 Ibid 
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price war. A key condition of entry is the existence of attractive, unused opportunities. The ferry market 
with its low growth and low profitability is not lucrative for new entrants. 
On the routes Helsinki-Mariehamn-Stockholm and Turku-Mariehamn-Stockholm, Viking Line and Tallink 
Silja are sharing the market on an equal basis.  
In traffic to Tallinn, Viking Line’s market share is clearly weaker, as this is Tallink’s home market. The 
market share of 24.7% means that Viking Line managed to reach and exceed its goal of 20% market 
share on the route, regardless of the increased competition by Tallink. Both companies have won 
market share from small competitors, increasing market concentration. Increased market shares cannot 
be occupied without providing fast, regular traffic with multiple turns. Tallink has a competitive 
advantage due to lower crew costs. 
In the cruise market from Stockholm or from Åland Islands, Tallink Silja is not present. Instead, Viking 
Line faces local competition from Eckerö Lines and Birka Lines. 
On the route Turku-Mariehamn-Stockholm, the introduction of the new ferry (or ferries) is likely to lead 
to large changes in market share for the benefit of Viking Line. 
The Russian market is expected to open up in the near future, providing more opportunities for growth. 
The following figure presents Viking Line’s market shares41 in 2011. 
 
 
                                                            
41 Viking Line annual report 11/2009-10/2011 
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5. Conclusions 
Viking Line’s current business model is conditional on the continuation of favorable circumstances. The 
tax derogation for Åland Islands is essential for the company’s business. It is important to interact both 
on the provincial and national levels to maintain the status quo in terms of a favorable regulatory 
environment. European-level cooperation is not feasible due to the unique tax conditions of Åland 
Islands. Cooperation on other issues, such as environmental standards or freedom of establishment, 
might be feasible on an international or EU level. 
Viking Line faced difficult times during and immediately after the accession of Estonia to the EU, which 
brought intense competition and a new kind of customer demand. The company is trying to meet this 
challenge by capturing more market share and by selling more to current clients on board. 
Although its actions have been more reactionary than visionary, the company has successfully defended 
its market position. However, it has failed to take the opportunity to become the market leader and now 
faces competition by a more cost-efficient rival, Tallink. This oligopolistic competition is likely to keep 
margins low in the future. The low profit margin, combined with an ageing fleet, is a problem. Luckily, 
Viking Line has some competitive advantages over Tallink Silja, and one of these advantages is a strong 
balance sheet42. Viking Line has survived without major problems, and even exploited the global 
recession in ordering a long-awaited new ship. Thus, Viking Line might yet emerge as a market leader in 
its core markets upon the introduction of the new ship(s). 
 
6.  Case questions for discussion 
1. What do you consider to be the most important changes that Viking Line is facing? 
2. What exactly did the management do to respond to these changes? 
3. How successful do you consider these responses to be? Why? 
4. What else could have been done? Would this have been more successful? Why? 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
42 See annex 4.; the net debt is negative 
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Annex 1: Viking Line’s largest owners as of October 31, 2010 
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Annex 2: The Verdict of the ECJ on Viking Line vs. Finnish Seamen’s Union 
 
Article 43 EC is to be interpreted as meaning that, in principle, collective action initiated by a trade union 
or a group of trade unions against a private undertaking in order to induce that undertaking to enter 
into a collective agreement, the terms of which are liable to deter it from exercising freedom of 
establishment, is not excluded from the scope of that article. 
 
2. Article 43 EC is capable of conferring rights on a private undertaking which may be relied on against a 
trade union or an association of trade unions. 
 
3. Article 43 EC is to be interpreted to the effect that collective action such as that at issue in the main 
proceedings, which seeks to induce a private undertaking whose registered office is in a given Member 
State to enter into a collective work agreement with a trade union established in that State and to apply 
the terms set out in that agreement to the employees of a subsidiary of that undertaking established in 
another Member State, constitutes a restriction within the meaning of that article. 
 
That restriction may, in principle, be justified by an overriding reason of public interest, such as the 
protection of workers, provided that it is established that the restriction is suitable for ensuring the 
attainment of the legitimate objective pursued and does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve 
that objective. 
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Annex 3: Article 87 in TEC and Derogations 
“Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or 
through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort 
competition by favoring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in 
so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal 
market” 
 
Derogations: 
 
2. The following shall be compatible with the internal market: 
 
1) aid having a social character, granted to individual consumers, provided that such 
aid is granted without discrimination related to the origin of the products concerned;  
 
2) aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or 
exceptional occurrences;  
 
3) aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic of Germany 
affected by the division of Germany, in so far as such aid is required in order to 
compensate for the economic disadvantages caused by that division. Five years 
after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Council, acting on a proposal 
from the Commission, may adopt a decision repealing this point.  
 
3. The following may be considered to be compatible with the internal market: 
 
1 aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living 
is abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment, and of the regions 
referred to in Article 349, in view of their structural, economic and social situation;  
 
2 aid to promote the execution of an important project of common European 
interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State;  
 
3 aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of 
certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading 
conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest;  
 
4 aid to promote culture and heritage conservation where such aid does not 
affect trading conditions and competition in the Union to an extent that is 
contrary to the common interest;  
 
5 such other categories of aid as may be specified by decision of the Council 
on a proposal from the Commission.  
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Annex 4: Financial Performance 2005-2010      
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Annex 5: The Status of Åland Islands 
 
 
“Åland acceded to the European Union in 1995, as an autonomous region of Finland. Its special 
status in the organization is regulated by Protocol No 2 annexed to the Finnish Act of accession. 
This document contains certain derogations from the application of EU law on Åland, including 
concerning the limitations pertaining to the right to domicile and the right of trade. 
 
The derogations allowed the continuation of tax – free sales on ferry traffic to and from Åland. 
Ferry traffic and tourism have a great importance for the Ålandic economy. 
 
These derogations make the Åland Islands a unique example among the EU members, as only a 
few territories have been granted permanent derogations from the EU primary law”.43 
 
  
                                                            
43 http://www.peace.ax/en/information-a-visits/the-Åland-example/339 09 February 2011 
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Annex 6: Ferry routes 
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Annex 7: The region 
 
http://www.worldatlas.com/aatlas/infopage/balticsea.htm 
 
 
